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Abstract
Analyses of text corpora over time can reveal trends in be-
liefs, interest, and sentiment about a topic. We focus on views
expressed about artificial intelligence (AI) in the New York
Times over a 30-year period. General interest, awareness, and
discussion about AI has waxed and waned since the field was
founded in 1956. We present a set of measures that captures
levels of engagement, measures of pessimism and optimism,
the prevalence of specific hopes and concerns, and topics that
are linked to discussions about AI over decades. We find that
discussion of AI has increased sharply since 2009, and that
these discussions have been consistently more optimistic than
pessimistic. However, when we examine specific concerns,
we find that worries of loss of control of AI, ethical concerns
for AI, and the negative impact of AI on work have grown in
recent years. We also find that hopes for AI in healthcare and
education have increased over time.
Introduction
Artificial intelligence will spur innovation and create oppor-
tunities, both for individuals and entrepreneurial companies,
just as the Internet has led to new businesses like Google and
new forms of communication like blogs and social network-
ing. Smart machines, experts predict, will someday tutor stu-
dents, assist surgeons and safely drive cars.
Computers Learn to Listen, and Some Talk Back. NYT, 2010
In the wake of recent technological advances in computer vi-
sion, speech recognition and robotics, scientists say they are
increasingly concerned that artificial intelligence technolo-
gies may permanently displace human workers, roboticize
warfare and make Orwellian surveillance techniques easier
to develop, among other disastrous effects.
Study to Examine Effects of Artificial Intelligence. NYT, 2014
These two excerpts from articles in the New York Times
lay out competing visions for the future of artificial intel-
ligence (AI) in our society. The first excerpt is optimistic
about the future of AI—the field will “spur innovation,” cre-
ating machines that tutor students or assist surgeons—while
the second is pessimistic, raising concerns about displaced
workers and dystopian surveillance technologies. But which
vision is more common in the public imagination, and how
have these visions evolved over time?
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Understanding public concerns about AI is important, as
these concerns can translate into regulatory activity with po-
tentially serious repercussions (Stone, P. et al. 2016). For
example, some have recently suggested that the government
should regulate AI development to prevent existential threats
to humanity (Guardian 2014). Others have argued that racial
profiling is implicit in some machine learning algorithms, in
violation of current law (ProPublica 2016). More broadly, if
public expectations diverge too far from what is possible, we
may court the smashed hopes that often follow from intense
enthusiasm and high expectations.
AI presents a difficult case for studies of topic sentiment
over time because the term is not precisely defined. Lay peo-
ple and experts alike have varied understandings of what “ar-
tificial intelligence” means (Stone, P. et al. 2016). Even in
the narrowest, engineering-centric definitions, AI refers to a
broad constellation of computing technologies.
We present a characterization of impressions expressed
about AI in the news over 30 years. First, we define a set of
indicators that capture levels of engagement, general senti-
ment, and hopes and concerns about AI. We then apply and
study these indicators across 30 years of articles from the
New York Times. As a proxy for public opinion and engage-
ment, no other corpus extends so far into the past to capture
how a general audience thinks about AI. Moving forward,
we can apply these indicators to present day articles in an
ongoing effort to track public perception.
Our study relies on a combination of crowdsourcing and
natural language processing. For each article under analysis,
we extract all mentions of artificial intelligence and use paid
crowdsourcing to annotate these mentions with measures
of relevance, their levels of pessimism or optimism about
AI, and the presence of specific hopes and concerns, such
as “losing control of AI” or “AI will improve healthcare.”
These annotations form the basis of the indicators and allow
us to bootstrap a classifier that can automatically extract im-
pressions about AI, with applications to tracking trends in
new articles as they are generated.
To study how public perception of AI has changed over
time, we analyze the set of indicators for articles published
in the New York Times between January 1986 and June
2016. We address four research questions:
R1: How prominent is AI in the public discussion today,
as compared to the past?
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R2: Have news articles become generally more optimistic
or more pessimistic about AI over time?
R3: What ideas are most associated with AI over time?
R4: What specific ideas were the public concerned about
in the past, which are no longer concerns today? Likewise,
what new ideas have arisen as concerns?
When we examine the impression indicators across histor-
ical data, we find that AI has generally taken on a stronger
role in public discussion over time—with a few notable
blips, such as the so-called AI winter in 1987. Further, we
find that the mood of discussion has generally remained
more optimistic over time, although this trend is not com-
mon across all concerns (e.g., AI’s impact on work). Finally,
we discover that some ideas, such as “AI for healthcare”
or “losing control of AI,” are more common today than in
the past. Other ideas, for example, that “AI is not making
enough progress” or that “AI will have a positive impact on
work,” were more common in the past than they are today.
Indicators of Impressions about AI
We capture the intensity of engagement on AI in the news as
well as the prevalence of a diverse set of hopes and concerns
about the future of AI. We took inspiration from the Asilo-
mar Study of 2008-09 (Horvitz and Selman 2009) and the
One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence (Stanford
University 2014) to create measures that capture a long-term
perspective for how AI impacts society.
General Measures
We have included the following general measures:
Engagement. This measure serves as a proxy for public
interest and engagement around AI, capturing how much AI
is discussed in the news over time.
Optimism vs. Pessimism. This measure captures the atti-
tude of a discussion—the degree to which it implies a sense
of optimism or pessimism about the future of AI. This at-
titude can stem from technological progress, such as opti-
mistic reporting on new breakthroughs in deep learning. But
it can also be influenced by the impact of new technologies
on society: for example, the time-saving benefits of a self-
driving car (a form of optimism); or the dangers of surveil-
lance as data is collected and mined to track our leanings, lo-
cations, and daily habits (a form of pessimism). We include
such attitudinal leanings as an indicator to track these high-
level trends. Notably, traditional sentiment analysis does not
capture optimism versus pessimism.
The remainder of our indicators capture common hopes
and concerns about the future of AI.
Hopes for Artificial Intelligence
We have included the following hopes for AI as indicators:
Impact on work (positive): AI makes human work easier
or frees us from needing to work at all, e.g., by managing our
schedules, automating chores via robots.
Education: AI improves how students learn, e.g., through
automatic tutoring or grading, or providing other kinds of
personalized analytics.
Transportation: AI enables new forms of transportation,
e.g., self-driving cars, or advanced space travel.
Healthcare: AI enhances the health and well-being of
people, e.g., by assisting with diagnosis, drug discovery, or
enabling personalized medicine.
Decision making: AI or expert systems help us make bet-
ter decisions, e.g., when to take a meeting, or case-based
reasoning for business executives.
Entertainment: AI brings us joy through entertainment,
e.g., though smarter enemies in video games.
Singularity (positive): A potential singularity will bring
positive benefits to humanity, e.g., immortality.
Merging of human and AI (positive): Humans merge
with AI in a positive way, e.g., robotic limbs for the disabled,
positive discussions about potential rise of transhumanism.
Concerns for Artificial Intelligence
We have also considered the following concerns for AI:
Loss of control: Humans lose control of powerful AI sys-
tems, e.g., Skynet or “Ex Machina” scenarios.
Impact on work (negative): AI displaces human jobs,
e.g., large-scale loss of jobs by blue collar workers.
Military applications: AI kills people or leads to instabil-
ities and warfare through military applications, e.g., robotic
soldiers, killer drones.
Absence of Appropriate Ethics: AI lacks ethical reason-
ing, leading to negative outcomes, e.g., loss of human life.
Lack of progress: The field of AI is advancing more
slowly than expected, e.g., unmet expectations like those
that led to an AI Winter.
Singularity (negative): The singularity harms humanity,
e.g., humans are replaced or killed.
Merging of human and AI (negative): Humans merge
with AI in a negative way, e.g., cyborg soldiers.
Data: Thirty Years of News Articles
We conduct our analysis over the full set of articles pub-
lished by the New York Times between January 1986 and
May 2016—more than 3 million articles in total.
We have created this dataset by querying the New York
Times public API for metadata (e.g., title of article, section
of paper, current URL) associated with articles published on
each individual day within the scope of our analysis. For
each article, we then scrape the full text from its URL using
the BeautifulSoup python package.
Next, we annotate articles on AI. Unfortunately, crowd-
sourcing annotations for full news articles is a complex task,
requiring a large time expenditure for workers. For this rea-
son we segment our data into paragraphs. In news articles,
paragraphs tend to be self-contained enough that workers
can annotate them accurately without reading the rest of the
article. This makes them a good middle ground between full
documents and individual sentences. For example:
Artificial intelligence “has great potential to benefit humanity
in many ways.” An association with weaponry, though, could
set off a backlash that curtails its advancement.
While the above paragraph clearly discusses AI for mili-
tary applications, annotating the same text at the sentence or
document level might not produce that annotation. For ex-
ample, sentence level annotations would not connect “its”
with AI, and document level annotations would too often re-
sult in workers missing the relevant passage, but paragraph
level annotations easily capture this relationship.
It is expensive to crowdsource annotations the tens of mil-
lions of paragraphs in the dataset, so we filter these para-
graphs to the set that contain “artificial intelligence”, “AI”,
or “robot”. (We include “robot” to increase coverage—we
are not concerned with false positives at this stage, as we
will later filter for relevance.) In total, we retrieve more than
8000 paragraphs that mention AI over a thirty year period.
Crowdsourcing to Annotate Indicators
Crowdsourcing provides an efficient way to gather annota-
tions for our dataset of AI-related paragraphs. In this section,
we present the details of the approach.
Task Setup
We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to collect anno-
tations for the more than 8000 AI-related paragraphs in our
dataset. We assigned each paragraph to a task with multi-
ple components. First, we collected annotations for attitude
about the future of AI (from pessimistic to optimistic) on a
5-point Likert scale. We then collected low level annotations
for all of the specific hopes and concerns developed. We re-
quested binary labels that indicate whether the hope or con-
cern is present in the paragraph (e.g., AI will have a negative
impact on work). Finally, to ensure that unrelated paragraphs
do not bias our results, we collected high-level annotations
for AI relevance (from strongly unrelated to strongly related)
on a 5-point Likert scale.
We assigned each AMT task to three independent work-
ers in pursuit of reliable labels (Sheng, Provost, and Ipeiro-
tis 2008). We provided examples to better ground the task
(Doroudi et al. 2016), and recruited Masters workers to en-
sure quality results. We paid $0.15 per task in line with
guidelines for ethical research (Salehi, Irani, and Bernstein
2015), for a total cost of $3825. In Supplementary Material,
we include a template for the task we used.
In general, workers show high rates of agreement over la-
bels for AI relevance and mood. Across paragraphs, 97% of
workers agreed that they were either at least somewhat re-
lated to AI or else unrelated. 70% of workers agreed when
distinguishing between optimistic and pessimistic articles.
When interpreting ratings for AI relevance and attitude, we
take the average across workers.
Interpreting annotations for hopes and concerns
One decision we must make is how to interpret the crowd
annotations for hopes and concerns. Should we require that
all three workers mark a paragraph with a hope or concern
to include it in our data? Or trust the majority vote of two
workers? Or require only one worker’s vote? Requiring a
larger number of votes will reduce the rate of false positives
(i.e., labeling a paragraph with a hope or concern it does not
exhibit), but may increase the rate of false negatives.
Figure 1: Articles that discuss AI over time, as a percentage
of the total number of articles published per year. The green
line plots optimistic articles and the yellow line plots pes-
simistic articles. AI discussion has exploded since 2009, but
levels of pessimism and optimism have remained balanced.
To determine the best approach, we established a ground
truth dataset for one example concern, military applications
for AI. We examined each paragraph associated with this
concern by at least one worker and determined whether it
in fact expressed that concern. This allowed us to calculate
precision and a proxy for recall1 across voting schemes.
We find a trade-off between precision and recall (Table 1).
Requiring two or more votes results in precision of 100%,
but recall of 59%. Alternatively, only requiring one worker
vote results in precision of 80% and recall of 100%. In light
of these numbers and the fact that many of our hopes and
concerns are covered sparsely in the dataset (for example,
we see only 231 mentions of “loss of control of AI” across
the thirty year corpus), we require only one worker vote to
label a paragraph with a given hope or concern.
# worker votes 1 2 3
precision 0.81 1.00 1.00
recall 1.00 0.59 0.18
Table 1: How voting schemes impact a paragraph’s associ-
ation with military applications in terms of precision and a
proxy for recall on ground truth data.
Trends in the Public Perception of AI
Using our crowdsourced annotations, we now analyze trends
in public impressions of AI over 30 years of news articles.
We conduct this analysis through four research questions.
R1: How prominent is discussion of AI?
A natural starting point for understanding the public percep-
tion of AI is to examine how frequently it is discussed over
time, and what events influence this discussion.
1This number will be higher than true recall, but describes how
many true positives we miss in the subset of ground truth data.
We capture this idea through an engagement measure. To
compute this, we first filter the data to include only para-
graphs with an average AI relevance rating of more than 3.0,
as determined by our crowdsourcing pipeline. We then ag-
gregate these paragraphs by the news article they appear in,
and further aggregate articles by their year of publication.
This leaves us with data that count how many articles that
mention AI are published every year from 1986 to 2016.
Finally, we normalize these counts by the total volume of
articles published each year.
We present a graph of AI engagement in Figure 1. Most
strikingly, we observe a dramatic rise in articles that men-
tion AI beginning in late 2009. While the cause of this rise
is unclear, it occurs following a renaissance in the use of
neural nets (”deep learning”) in natural language and per-
ceptual applications, and after a front page story discussed
the Asilomar meeting (Horvitz and Selman 2009). We also
observe a fall in AI discussion that corresponds with the start
of the 1987 AI winter—reaching its lowest level in 1995.
R2: Have impressions reported in the news become
more optimistic or pessimistic about AI?
In addition to engagement, we studied indicators for levels
of pessimism and optimism in the coverage of AI. How have
these levels changed over time? While it is easy to imagine
a public celebration of AI technology as it becomes more
common, it is also possible to imagine greater levels of con-
cern, as people worry about changes they cannot control.
To track public sentiment over time, we draw on the
dataset of AI-related news articles, aggregated by year, that
we created for R1. We divide each year into counts of opti-
mistic and pessimistic articles, as determined by the attitude
rating in our crowdsourcing pipeline (considering an article
optimistic if it has an average rating greater than 3, and pes-
simistic if it has an average rating of less than three).
We present the resulting trends in Figure 1. In general, AI
has had consistently more optimistic than pessimistic cov-
erage over time, roughly 2-3 times more over the 30 year
period. Since 2009, both optimistic and pessimistic cover-
age have exploded along with general interest in AI.
R3: What kinds of ideas are associated with AI,
and how have they changed?
The field of AI has changed enormously since 1986. What
kinds of ideas did people associate with AI in the past, and
how have these ideas changed in the present?
To find out, we investigate the keywords most associ-
ated with AI-related articles from different time periods. We
gather these keywords—for example, “space” or “world pol-
itics” or “driverless vehicles”—from the New York Times
API. We then group all New York Times articles into six
five-year intervals between 1986 and 2016, and compute the
mutual information (MI) between keyword counts and AI
articles within each time period. For example, the keyword
“space” might appear 80 times across all articles and 25
times in association with AI-related articles between 1986
and 1990, producing high MI with AI for that time period.
This gives us a measure of the keywords most associated
with AI articles over time. We then look across time periods
and record themes in how these keywords change.
We present a sample of the keywords most strongly asso-
ciated with AI for each time period in Figure 2. Each key-
word in the sample is among the 50 most related for that
period and applies to at least two AI articles in the corpus.
Some keywords (e.g., “robot”) are common across all peri-
ods, and we did not include these in the sample. Other key-
words (e.g., “computer games”) remain strongly related to
AI after the first time period in which they appear.
The change in AI-associated keywords across time is re-
vealing. From the concept of space weapons in 1986:
Real-time parallel processing may be the computational key
to the creation of artificial intelligence, and conceivably to
such functions as the control of President Reagan’s Strategic
Defensive Initiative, or Star Wars, program.
To chess in 1997:
Even before the world chess champion Garry Kasparov faced
the computer Deep Blue yesterday, pundits were calling the
rematch another milestone in the inexorable advance of arti-
ficial intelligence.
To search engines in 2006:
Accoona is a search engine that uses a heavy dose of artificial
intelligence to find results that Google may miss.
To driverless vehicles in 2016:
United States vehicle safety regulators have said the artificial
intelligence system piloting a self-driving Google car could
be considered the driver under federal law.
We also observe how the association of AI with individual
keywords changes across time. For example, the association
between AI and science fiction, while present across all pe-
riods, peaks in the early 1990s.
R4: How have public hopes and concerns about AI
changed over time?
Beyond keywords, we studied indicators for fine-grained set
of hopes and concerns related to AI. Here we examine how
these ideas have evolved over time.
To this end, we examine all paragraphs tagged with AI
hopes and concerns. We aggregate each of these paragraphs
by article, and then by year. We consider an article as ex-
pressing a given hope or concern if it contains at least one
paragraph that the crowd labeled with that concept. This
gives us data that count the total number of times each AI
hope and concern is expressed per article per year. We nor-
malize these data by the total number of AI-related articles
published per year, to arrive at a yearly percentage of AI-
related articles that discuss each hope and concern.
We present the resulting trends in Figure 3. While some
data are sparse, we observe several clear upward trends. The
fear of loss of control, for example, has become far more
common in recent years—more than triple what it was as
a percentage of AI articles in the 1980s (Figure 3M). For
example, in one article from 2009:
Impressed and alarmed by advances in artificial intelligence,
a group of computer scientists is debating whether there
Figure 2: New York Times keywords associated with articles that mention AI over time. For example, chess emerges most
strongly in the late 1990s, after Deep Blue beats Kasparov.
Figure 3: Hopes and concerns from 1986 to 2016. In recent years, we see an increase in concern that humanity will lose of
control of AI, and hope for the beneficial impact of AI on healthcare. The y-axis measures the percentage of AI articles that
mention a specific hope or concern.
should be limits on research that might lead to loss of hu-
man control over computer-based systems that carry a grow-
ing share of society’s workload, from waging war to chatting
with customers on the phone.
Ethical concerns for AI have also become more common,
driven in part by similar existential worries (Figure 3L). For
example, in an article from 2015:
Two main problems with artificial intelligence lead people
like Mr. Musk and Mr. Hawking to worry. The first, more
near-future fear, is that we are starting to create machines that
can make decisions like humans, but these machines don’t
have morality and likely never will.
These trends suggest an increase in public belief that we may
soon be capable of building dangerous AI systems.
From a more positive standpoint, AI hopes for healthcare
have also trended upwards (Figure 3G). One strong theme is
AI systems that care for patients. From 2003:
For patients with more advanced cases, the researchers held
out the possibility of systems that use artificial intelligence
techniques to determine whether a person has remembered to
drink fluids during the day.
Another driver of this trend is systems that can diagnose pa-
tients, or bioinformatics to cure disease. From 2013:
After Watson beat the best human Jeopardy champions in
2011, its artificial intelligence technology was directed to-
ward new challenges, like assisting doctors in making diag-
noses in a research project at the Cleveland Clinic.
In contrast, concerns over lack of progress have decreased
over time, despite a recent uptick (Figure 3P). This concern
reached its high in 1988, at the start of the AI winter:
The artificial intelligence industry in general has been going
through a retrenchment, with setbacks stemming from its fail-
ure to live up to its promises of making machines that can
recognize objects or reason like a human.
Intriguingly, many articles labeled with this concern in re-
cent years draw reference to the past—a kind of meta-
discussion about the lack of progress concern itself.
Among the remainder of the trends, a positive view of
the impact of AI on human work has become less common,
while a negative view has increased sharply in recent years
Figure 4: We validated the increasing concern in loss of con-
trol on Reddit data. The y-axis measures the percentage of
AI-related comments that mention loss of control of AI.
(Figure 3E-F). AI for education has grown over time (Figure
3D), as has a positive view of merging with AI (Figure 3I)
and the role of AI in fiction (Figure 3N).
News Articles from 1956 to 1986
The New York Times provides full text for articles published
after 1986, but article abstracts (short descriptions of arti-
cle content) are available over a much longer time period.
To extend our results, we collected a dataset of all abstracts
published between 1956 (the year of the first AI workshop
at Dartmouth) and 1986.
Articles that mention AI are less common over this ear-
lier period, with only 40 abstracts that reference AI (the first
appears in 1977) and 247 that mention robots. These data
are too sparse to extend our earlier analyses to 1956, but we
have manually annotated each abstract with topic keywords
to observe themes over time.
In the 1950s, robots are most associated with mili-
tary applications and especially missiles, e.g., “the guided
missile—the almost human robot of the skies.” The 1960s
and 70s strongly emphasize space, as in “a ten-pound robot
was shot into orbit today.” Interest in AI picks up consider-
ably in the early 1980s, where we see the first article that
worries AI will negatively impact human jobs, the first re-
ported death via robot, “a factory worker killed by a robot
arm,” and the first mention of AI in healthcare, “a robot to
prepare meals and perform other chores for quadriplegics.”
External validity
Do the trends we have discovered in the New York Times
generalize to the public at large? While this question is dif-
ficult to answer directly, we have replicated one of our pri-
mary findings on 5 years of public posts from Reddit, a pop-
ular online community with a diverse set of users.
Concretely, we train a classifier to predict the presence of
loss of control in paragraphs about AI using our annotated
data from the New York Times. We then apply this classi-
fier to posts made by Reddit users. We use a logistic regres-
sion model based on TF-IDF features and threshold the pos-
itive class probability at 0.9. In validation, we observe pre-
cision of 0.8 on a sample of 100 Reddit posts annotated with
ground truth. Finally, we apply this classifier to every post
that mentioned “artificial intelligence” from 2010 to 2015.
We present the resulting trend in Figure 4, which mirrors
Figure 3M over the same time period. Broadly, this replica-
tion suggests that attitudes among Reddit users shift in line
with what we see in the New York Times, providing some
evidence for the external validity of our findings.
Related Work
Others have discussed the impact of artificial intelligence
on society and the range of future outcomes (Dietterich and
Horvitz 2015). These discussions are in part driven by a need
to address public concerns about AI—our work is the first to
quantify such concerns through direct analysis. The set of in-
dicators we have introduced will be useful in framing future
discussions, such as those ongoing in the One Hundred Year
Study of Artificial Intelligence (Stanford University 2014).
Public opinion polls have similarly measured topics rele-
vant to AI. While such polls are recent (and not conducted
over time), they support our findings, showing greater levels
of optimism than pessimism about AI, but increasing exis-
tential fear and worry about jobs (BSA 2015; 60 Minutes
2016). Future polls might allow us to directly measure pub-
lic opinion on the set of measures we have studied.
Beyond artificial intelligence, other work has mined cul-
tural perspectives from text corpora over long time periods.
For example, by analyzing 200 years of data from Google
Books, it is possible to quantify the adoption of new tech-
nologies or changes in psychological attitudes through lin-
guistic patterns (Michel et al. 2011; Greenfield 2013). Using
music, others have quantified changes in artistic style over a
40 year period (Serra` et al. 2012). We use crowdsourced an-
notations to extend the limits of what is possible under these
kinds of quantitative analyses.
News and social media offer a powerful reflection of pub-
lic attitudes over time. For example, by analyzing such data,
it is possible to predict cultural events such as revolutions
(Radinsky and Horvitz 2013; Leetaru 2011), or examine
public opinion on same-sex marriage (Zhang and Counts
2015). Here we use such data to discover and validate simi-
lar trends in the public perception of artificial intelligence.
Finally, crowdsourcing is a powerful tool for enabling
new kinds of quantitative analyses. For example, it is pos-
sible to crowdsource lexicons of words to answer novel re-
search questions (Fast, Chen, and Bernstein 2016), or lever-
age crowds to bootstrap classifiers that can then be applied to
much larger corpora (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2013;
Fast and Horvitz 2016). Here we use crowds to identify
themes in articles that would be difficult to analyze under
fully automated approaches.
Conclusion
We present a set of indicators that capture levels of engage-
ment, general sentiment, and hopes and concerns for the
future of artificial intelligence over time. We then validate
these impression indicators by studying trends in 30 years of
articles from the New York Times. We find that discussion
of AI has increased sharply since 2009 and has been con-
sistently more optimistic than pessimistic. However, many
specific concerns, such as the fear of loss of control of AI,
have been increasing in recent years.
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